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ARE THE "MINUTE MEN" FAST ENOUGH? A HISTORICAL LOOK AT PRE AND POST MOBILIZATION TRAINING

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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By January 1, 1991 over two hundred thousand Reserve and National Guard soldiers had been mobilized in support of Operation Desert Shield (and eventually Desert Storm) in the Persian Gulf War. Included in this mobilization were three National Guard combat brigades. The time between notification and deployment to combat of our reserve forces has varied a great deal throughout our country's history. There is a great deal of argument in government as well as in the Army itself as to the ability of combat, combat support, and combat service support reserve units to move rapidly from a peace time training status to commitment in combat. This study reviews the large scale reserve and national guard mobilizations from World War II to present. The study clarifies some of the variables which affect training time and focuses on the time between notification and actual commitment to combat. Because call ups in World War II, Korea, Berlin (1961), and Vietnam were extensive, the author has concentrated on Pacific bound units from each war. The Pacific is an area of special important as the U.S. national interests begin to focus less on Europe and more on our major trading partners in the Pacific Rim. Each section or conflict is followed by a lessons learned summary and tied to the following conflict. The entire study is brought to a close with conclusions and recommendations for future training and employment of reserve components.

INTRODUCTION

Desert Shield and Desert Storm have reintroduced a major point of conflict into the American defense system once again. As Congressman Les Aspin stated in a report to Congress in January 1991, "Reserve proponents argue that the Reserves are ready to execute their mission. Those who oppose use of the Reserves argue that they would need 60 to 90 days of additional training before they could be deployed."

Time between notification and deployment of our reserve forces has varied a great deal over our countries history. In the countries earliest battles at Lexington and Concord the "minute men" were indeed minute men who went directly from their plows and fields to firing line. Conversely, in World War II (WW II) many Reserve Component (RC) units spent considerable amounts of time in training before being committed to battle. As an example the 35th Infantry Division (ID) was activated in the fall, 1940 and did not deploy to combat until July, 1944, following D-Day.

This paper will attempt to clarify some of the variables which affect particularly training time required for reserve units. It will focus on the time between mobilization and the time the unit is deployed to full duty. A review of pre and post mobilization training by reserve units in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam will attempt to discover guide posts for the future.

In order understand the arena in which these units will

function, one needs to consider the type of world where this future army will be expected to fight. Many have called the new post-cold war world a multipolar one. Prior to Glasnost and Perestroika, the bipolar world saw a large standing Active army in Europe consisting of two U.S. Army Corps. This large active force required a lion's share of our defense effort and focused the RC on their traditional role; reinforcing the active components (AC) in order to rapidly back fill these forward deployed active Corps.

The new multipolar world no longer seems to be Europe centered. Asia, Africa, South East Asia, and the Pacific Basin all clamor for attention after decades of second place. Japan, U.S., Soviet Union, Peoples Republic of China, India, and the entire Pacific rim region compete for resources and dollars with traditional European needs.

"Economics is key to increased importance of (these) region(s)" states LTG Kicklighter, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC).¹ The general also clearly states the U.S. need to remain a world player in his comment "This multipolar world... demands that we be a full participant in the growth and change occurring...Living in a multipolar world means developing and maintaining a multidimensional focus."

As the threat environment has shifted at least to some extent from Europe, regional and short reaction conflict have become more common.² Even as this multipolar shift has been

taking place; General Vuono stated in a recent white paper that the forward-deployed force structure has remained about the same while the contingency army for reinforcement has grown with this multipolar threat.³ The lessening of a major war scenario raises questions about the proper mix of active and reserve forces for NATO and the rest of the world.

Two basic assumptions can be made based on this decreased threat in Europe. First, the total army's current strength levels will come down and second, plans for expansion will be necessary.⁴ This increased requirement for future mobilization infer an even greater reason to ensure that training scenarios for reserves are correct. For example, as future reduction in active divisions takes place, this loss of combat force structure will cause some corresponding reduction in reserve forces since a major portion of the combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) for these active combat units is in the reserve.

What type of conflicts will this "new" army have to contend with? A look at a number of possibilities which still exist to threaten U.S. interests is in order.

MAJOR WORLD WARS

Many large scale threats remain for the army, the U.S. could still be called upon to fight a major land war such as World War

I or II. Included in this scenario would be a major Soviet attack requiring a massive reaction from the U.S. This major land campaign would be more difficult for the Soviets due to the unification of Germany and the disintegration of the Warsaw pact, but is still a possibility. Conflicts involving less terrain and other countries are also a possibility. This lesson has been recently underscored by the necessity of waging a conventional land war against the Tank/artillery heavy Iraqi Army.

REGIONAL SHORT WARS

Since World War II the countries active and reserve forces have been also been required for such actions as Korea, Lebanon, the Cuban missile crises, the Berlin Wall and airlift, the Dominican Republic (twice!), Vietnam, Grenada, and Panama.⁵ These major actions saw large numbers of reserve forces called to active duty.

The organized reserves could have expanded in any of these cases to almost two million men without conscription.⁶ The expansion necessitated by these contingencies tasked the training status of both the reserve and active components. General Vessey, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, suggested that the "nation's strategy may evolve from deterrence to mobilization."⁷

There also exists the real need to be able to use active and reserve forces in smaller and more specialized roles. A look at the vast series of interactions grouped under the title Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) would be helpful at this point.

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Total Force policy must also prepare for a myriad of less than "big war" conflicts. After World War I and II, U.S. military involvement often required RC augmentation but did not require the "traditional" major mobilizations of those wars. Current Joint Doctrine calls for U.S. Armed Forces to be able to conduct the following list of small conflict actions.

1. Help selected nations defend themselves.
2. Support selected insurgent movements.
3. Participate in peacekeeping activities.
4. Combat terrorism.
5. Suppress international drug trafficking.
6. Conduct contingency operations.
7. Anticipate long duration LIC operations.
8. Others.

This list of items only touches some of the many LIC actions reserve forces not only prepare for but in some ways may be better able to perform than active units. Considering the number of world wide scenarios that could confront U.S. forces, an attempt to cover all contingencies could expand this study beyond what is reasonable for an MSP. Therefore the study will

focus on the Pacific basin, one of the most diverse likely theaters for U.S. involvement. A look at the nature of the Pacific will explain it's unique characteristics.

PACIFIC BASIN UNIQUE REQUIREMENTS

A major rationale for limiting the focus to one region is simply the size of the requirement! All aspects of the conflicts outlined earlier present themselves in the Pacific Rim region. Over the last decade rim countries have traded more with the U.S. than the U.S. has with all of Europe . Defense and use of many Pacific islands is a unique and vital area of our national interests. The requirements of LIC alone in the Pacific range from peace keeping and nation building through counter insurgency operations. The total area of the Pacific is 52% of the earth's surface. More than 40 nations, including eight of the world's most populous, are in the region and it is home for 60% of the world's population. . In order to acquaint the reader with the threat of conflict in the Pacific, the following factors are included.

GENERAL REGIONAL THREAT

Uneven economic growth and competition provide a hot bed for future conflict and instability in the Pacific. "Single

overarching regional alliance(s) like NATO...do not exist...increasing competition...for greater global, as well as, regional influence. Territorial disputes or potential regional wars affect the entire pacific rim in areas such as:

India-China, China-Taiwan,
Vietnam-China, Vietnam-Cambodia,
India-Pakistan, Burma-Tailand,
Cambodia-Tailand, Papua New
Guinea-Indonesia

RC forces are devoting more and more training time and money in missions directed at the countries of the rim. One example is the annual Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS) where twenty six pacific nations discussed military and reserve training and professional development this past year.

REGIONAL CONFLICT

Although certainly not a "Pacific unique" feature, regional conflict takes on special climatic flavor which encourages mission focus. The most likely conflict is still on the Korean peninsula. Any major military action in Korea would require considerable reinforcements but the nearest active division is a Light Division in Hawaii. The heavier RC separate infantry brigade in Hawaii with it's higher levels of equipment and anti tank weapons might be preferred instead.

The Philippines remain a second scenario which could require a quick and decisive U.S. response. Cultural and ethnic ties of

many Pacific based RC units make them top candidates for any missions there.

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Low Intensity Conflict is of special significance for the Pacific. The following list by Harry Summers highlights specific areas where regionally Pacific based RC units maybe called upon to participate.

"The army must be trained to accomplish political military analysis, overt intelligence collection, civic action, long-range surgical strikes, raids, rescues, escape and evasion, personnel snatches, counter-terrorism, security assistance management, mobile training teams, interdiction, sabotage, insurgency, stay-behind forces, counter-insurgency, psychological operations, resistance formations, and long-range reconnaissance. 11

Besides engaging in possible counter insurgency actions in a LIC role, military units in the Pacific are used in a number of non traditional roles which are now an accepted part of LIC doctrine. When Hurricane Tusi left thousands homeless in Samoa in 1987, the RC unit there could not wait to "train up to standard". 12

U.S. Army is the PACOM lead for ground counter-narcotics operations in Alaska, Hawaii, and U.S. territories or possessions. 13 RC units in Hawaii have been conducting training and missions in this area for five years before

Department of Defense required AC units to get on board.

Nation building is another area where low profile "ethnically correct" RC units often have the advantage over AC units. Engineer projects in the Philippines with Filipino Americans and Joint Exercises in Japan by Japanese Americans are two current examples of success stories. Training requirements in this arena lag far behind the already backlogged mission requirements.

As economic tension increases the chance of Peacekeeping missions on the rim increase. In traditional cultural clashes RC units often have a language, cultural, and ethnic affinity which makes them ideal in this area.

PACIFIC ISLAND DEFENSE

A final unique mission for military units in the Pacific is currently called "Point Defense" and is well suited to RC units. Many island nations have no U.S. Army presence yet are vital to our national defense strategy. Guam and American Samoa both are major refueling and stop over areas. Islands like these require that their home based RC units be instantly ready to defend not only the island but point targets such as air fields, ports, and staging areas. Training for these RC units is critical as they would have to receive reinforcements from the AC not the other way as is the norm.

QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

RC units in the Pacific rim have the duty of participating across the spectrum of conflict. Over the past fifty years they have participated in three bloody wars- WW II, Korea, and Vietnam- as well as Low Intensity Conflict in the Philippines in the early part of this century. Considering their possible future commitment in this increasingly important area, what type of roles should RC units have in the future? Can history teach us anything?

The proceeding questions prompt a desire to search out answers to RC training procedures and requirements. In the following chapters of this paper we will review the pre and post mobilization history of RC pacific participation. The paper will conclude with recommendations and possible strategies for future deployments.

TRAINING AS RELATED TO MOBILIZATION

The National Defense University defines mobilization as "the art of preparing for war or other emergencies through assembling¹⁴ and organizing national resources." MG Ward, Chief, Army Reserve, has stated that "Goals are to be able to mobilize and deploy required forces within the time frames established in the Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) to support National

Security Objectives."¹⁵ "Increasing integration of Reserve forces...guarantees the need to call up some RC...for any substantial U.S. military operation."¹⁶ Partial, Selective, or Full; how the country chooses to mobilize has a great deal of impact on pre and post mobilization training. The different types of mobilization place different strains on the active units, personnel fill policy, and formal army "school houses".

Three milestones exist in mobilization documentation. First, the National Security Act of 1947 tried to institutionalize mobilization planning government wide.¹⁷ Lack of money caused this system to fail and it was not until the Reagan years that the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board was established.¹⁸ Specific army mobilization guidance from the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) uses the Army Mobilization Operations Planning System (AMOPS) as an implementing vehicle.¹⁹

CREDIBILITY

"Over the past 27 years, the reserve components have played a key role in the credibility of our deterrent force."²⁰

Trained and ready adds the credibility. The most elaborate plans for RC mobilization mean nothing if the forces called take two years of training to be deployed. RC participation in Desert Shield operations serve notice to many that U.S. RC

forces are indeed trained and ready. It also indicates that some may need longer training periods.

As our forward deployed AC army continues to down size, the reinforcing RC army must increase training readiness to make up the difference in reaction capability.²¹ Except for the 1st Infantry Division (Mech) and the 2d Armored Division, all AC mobilization force divisions have a RC round out Brigade.²² Given this emphasis on using RC elements for future conflicts, what historically have RC soldiers been able to accomplish in training and mobilization?

THE RESERVE SOLDIER AS A HISTORICAL FIGURE

Regiments of the National Guard can trace the longest history of any military organization in the United States and were employed from the earliest settlement to defend the nation.²³ As early as 1636 militia elements which would become the 182d Massachusetts Infantry were formed to protect the frontier. In 1652 the first members what would be called the 176th Virginia Infantry were created. These and other state militia are protected against abolition by the Second Amendment to the Constitution via the Bill of Rights.²⁴

The founding fathers of this country clearly felt that the major burden of defending the nation should rest in the militia or RC component of the army.²⁵ This is carefully spelled out

in Article One, section 1 of the Constitution which states:

To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.

26

Article One also states that the Federal government is...

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States...

27

The purpose of this militia, now the guard was to defend the nation. During the American Revolution, militia troops responded and were a part of the force which Washington built to defeat the British. Deep resentment for standing armies in America and England existed and the post revolution Constitutional Convention reflected this.

Washington, Hamilton, and Madison all supported some style of militia for national defense and pushed for federal

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legislation. In 1790, Secretary of War, Henry Knox proposed the Knox Plan which clearly indicated that a strong militia, trained to national standards was the main defense for the

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nation. In addition to universal training standards, the Plan called for 10-30 days of training per year, federal pay while at camp, as well as federal arms, equipment, and clothing.

Strong states rights feeling in Congress caused the Knox

Plan to be "watered down" but it still passed in 1792 as the
First Militia Act.³⁰ This Act would provide the legal basis
for the country's RC until 1903.³¹ Although it established
broad national universal military service, the Act lacked
national training standards.³² It also did not provide for
national organization or federal equipping.

In the War of 1812 the prominent land victory, the Battle of
New Orleans, was won by militiaman Andrew Jackson while
commanding militia troops.³³ During the Mexican War in the
first half of the nineteenth century, the ability of using the
RC to expand the regular army was clearly demonstrated when the
Active force ballooned from 6,500 to over 103,000 men using
volunteer militia. When the Civil War erupted Presidents
Lincoln and Davis had no choice but to depend on State troops to
fulfill military needs.

These "volunteers" created problems however, which plagued
the government right through the Spanish-American War. State
recognized and commissioned, some units had not reported to
federal duty in the various wars because the Governors held that
the militia could only be used inside state boundaries.³⁴

The Dick Act of 1903, with it's 1908 amendments called the
Militia Act,³⁵ tried to remedy these short comings. The Acts
called for increased federal spending, a "National" role for the
guard, and stated clearly that the "National Guard" as it was
now called could be used outside the U.S.³⁶ Twenty four days

of drill per year, five days of summer camp, and Active Army advisors were also provided by the Acts.

At the turn of the century, the Federal Reserve Force (which would become the present day Army Reserve) was also

created.³⁷ The advantage of this force was that they were not subject to State missions or state call up. Elihu Root, first commandant of the U.S. Army War College, reorganized the reserves under the authority of the Dick Act and gave them increased support.³⁸ Required equipment and training standards were also made more comparable to the regulars.³⁹

World War I saw another great influx of RC forces from the newly created Army Reserve and the National Guard. The RC provided seventeen combat divisions as the army went from under a quarter of a million to over 3.5 million men.

Discussions on how to solve the peacetime manning and force mix were wide ranging between the world wars. One suggestion was to adopt a variation of the German universal military service system where all men were subject to service for a short period and then put into a reserve status.⁴⁰ This type of universal service had little appeal in the U.S. culture even during the 1930s depression.

The National Defense Act of 1916 with the 1920 amendments set national standards for officers and doubled the number of drill periods.⁴¹ Additionally, the National Guard (NG) now had to match Active Army Tables of Organization.⁴² In 1933

the last amendments to the 1916 Act set the legal status for RC which has remained relatively unchanged until the present day. These amendments spell out ways that the NG can be called to Federal service and encouraged the Federal government to keep NG units together after their mobilization.⁴³ Thus, American tradition by 1940 was firmly set on a minimal peacetime defense posture (active and reserve)⁴⁴ with energy and money going to the commercial sector.

History would show, however, that even with little official support reserve members would continually respond to their countries call. With World War II being the most significant test of American military strength, a look at how well this system functioned is important.

UNITS CALLED FOR WORLD WAR II

By early 1940 as war was raging both in Europe and Asia, the active army stood at just over a quarter of a million men.⁴⁵ This number was obviously not sufficient if the United States became involved. We began to seriously study how best to mobilize reserves. We went to war in 1917 by mobilizing the reserves and since our overall participation was very successful, nothing caused us to question the mobilization army concept.

The National Guard in June 1940 had 240,000 men on the roles

but their units were all pitifully short of equipment across the board. This was not an ambitious start for an RC mobilization which would see a six fold multiplication in one year; resulting in a final manpower number 24 times bigger only four years

⁴⁶ later! In the September 1940 to June 1941 time period

alone, more than eighteen full divisions would be

⁴⁷ mobilized. The mobilization of such a force strained the training base of the Army beyond it's capabilities. For the next 1-2 years, the increased pace of training for RC units would occupy much of the Army's time.

To attempt to analyze the problems and issues facing all RC units would be virtually an impossible task, as a consequence I have selected two "type" National Guard divisions which would both see duty in the Pacific theater. The 40th and 41st Infantry Divisions serve as excellent role models for the entire activation and training process in the pre-1942 mobilization and training scenario. Post-1942 reserve training was a bit different and will be looked at later in this paper.

ACTIVATION AND TRAINING OF THE 41ST INFANTRY DIVISION

The 41st Infantry Division was mobilized 16 September, 1940 for a years training. National Guardsmen from the great Northwest filled the ranks the "Jungleers" as the division would come to be known under General MacArthur. Men from Oregon,

Idaho, Montana, and Washington would be supplemented by
Selective Service enrollees from every state after
mobilization.⁴⁸ Pre war restrictions on money and training
periods did not preclude individuals from striving to learn
their army trades. Proud men gave up their two week vacations
and studied military text books at home to insure their
readiness to serve.⁴⁹ Men gathered in the evening at
different homes to study training mannuals and practice army
exercises, all on unpaid drill time.

As was traditional, the training between the wars for the
41st consisted of weekly drill nights and a two week annual
training period.⁵⁰ Lack of major end items and many not so
major ones kept most training to individual and small unit
level. Trucks, machine guns, and communications equipment were
often in short supply; a situation common to most RC divisions
at this time. Crew served weapons and "pioneer" tools would
sometimes be shared from company to company. Camp Murray,
Washington, had to be built from the mud up by the men of the
41st.⁵¹

This lack of equipment did not affect the men's attitude for
training according to COL Sam King (U.S. Army, Retired) then a
Company Commander in the 41st. "Our training plans came from
Ft. Benning and followed standard army programs of instruction.
Although less centralized and structured than today's training
schedules, they provided sound tactical instruction up to and

past our commitment to combat in New Guinea." ⁵²

Hints of a possible mobilization came as early as the Summer of 1940. Summer camp for the division started normally in early August 1940 and was scheduled to last two weeks. Soon after camp started, it was clear that this would not be a normal tenure. Training was subsequently extended to three weeks, resulting in rumors that a longer period of active service was ⁵³ planned.

As rumored on 27 August 1940 the unit was informed by Department of the Army that they would be federalized on 16 September for a period of one year. The 41st and three other National Guard divisions were activated on the sixteenth. The mobilization moved slowly because it was complicated by the simultaneous mobilization of other units at the same time and training would constantly be slowed as more and more units were added to the mobilization base. By early 1942 in addition to the 18 divisions activated, over one thousand miscellaneous ⁵⁴ separate units would be called.

The 41st Infantry Division closed on Camp Murray near what is today Ft. Lewis, Washington on 23 September with 14,000 of ⁵⁵ their required wartime strength of 18,300. This under strength condition would be a constant drain on division resources and will be seen again and again in future mobilizations. The difference in wartime required numbers and ⁵⁶ reporting strength was to be made up from draftees. This

insured that there would always been a number of men in the division who would be trying to play catch up with the rest of the troops in terms of training.

October and November saw the beginning of Basic Training and one day a week field problems were run at squad and platoon level.⁵⁷ Basic Training was required since many new men had enlisted prior to mobilization and although carried on the unit roles had never been to any formal army schools. Large numbers of Selective Service enrollees would further task this training soon after mobilization. The Artillery range was finished and in limited use by mid November and platoon combat teams were formed and began to train. As 1940 turned into 1941, the 41st continued to train and gradually built up unit training to company and battalion size units by the spring.

In June and July 1941 sixty five thousand troops joined together with the 41st for massive war games designed to surface any problems at the division and corps level. Short comings thus identified received continued work back in Camp Murray thorough August and September.

Training took place in three general periods. In September to December; individual up through platoon size. January through May; Company and Battalion operations. Maneuvers at Brigade up to Corps from June through September. Thus, seven months were required to bring the unit to Regimental training levels and into division training. Results were impressive

however. LTG McNair, Army Chief of Staff and his action officers, LTC Mark Clark and COL Dwight Eisenhower called the 41st the top-ranking National Guard Division and one of the top three in the Army.⁵⁸ Several "side issues" pulled at all the units activated during this time and one of the biggest training distractors was training the "fillers". In 1941 Basic training was done in replacement centers and tactical units drew their personnel from these schools after graduation.⁵⁹ Overwhelmed in early 1942, the War Department told all units to draw fillers directly from various reception centers and to train them in the unit.⁶⁰

This requirement to do your own basic training caused major problems for each division and was impossible to "regulate" to any army wide standard. At the same time, in the 41st as well as other Guard and Reserve units, top quality people were being stripped out to attend special officer and enlisted schools. Furthermore, the first of 7,000 draftees arrived and needed training. The 41st solution was to further strain the division by forming a "training cadre" to schedule, plan, and run all division individual training.⁶¹ This cadre group would eventually train enough draftees to bring the division to over 21,000 men!

In January and February many active and guard divisions underwent a major TO&E change when they were all reorganized from the old four regiment "square" to the new three regimental

triangular division. In late February 1942 the 41st division began to out load the first of it's troops for Australia. Once in Australia, division level training would continue four more months until the unit deployed in combat in late 1942. The 41st Infantry Division thus spent two years and three months going from a poorly equipped and partly manned force to a combat ready division. Activated in September 1940, the division was one of the first to see combat in fall of 1942; chosen by the Department of War to deploy ahead of it's Active "sister" division from Ft. Lewis, the 3rd Infantry.

ACTIVATION AND TRAINING OF THE 40TH INFANTRY DIVISION

The 40th Infantry Division (ID) is an interesting comparison to the 41st because it was one of the last National Guard units to be called. Primarily made up of units from the California National Guard the division also received units from Utah and Nevada.⁶²

Like it's sister division from Washington, the 40th was short equipment. The stress for the Army of mobilizing many divisions during the prior year meant that men of the 40th still trained with homemade .50 cal machine guns in some units.⁶³ The unit would still have WW I type "pie plate" helmets when they shipped out for Hawaii in October 1942.

Activated in March of 1941, the 40th ID should have been

able to benefit from lesson learned by HQDA over the previous seven months. This was not always the case although many of the common problems both divisions would face were caused by the same rapid expansion which was hurting the entire army. In April 1941 the 40th was ordered to training camp at San Luis Obispo, California.⁶⁴ The division underwent many of the same problems of low personnel numbers and untrained filler personnel that the 41st had before them. Summer and fall of 1941 saw the division struggling to in process and train draftees as well as accommodate and train on new equipment.

Ready or not the division training cycle was interrupted on 8 December 1941 when the entire division was placed in active status and used to provide coastal security for the California coast.⁶⁵ Not only did this "active duty" time distract from training but in February, 1942 the "triangulation" of the division TO&E took place.⁶⁶

After the hysteria of early 1942 quieted down, the 40th was pulled off "Coast Watch" and ordered to Ft. Lewis, Washington to resume formal training in April 1942. Spring and summer were taken up with individual and small unit training with the division undergoing Regimental Combat Tests in July.⁶⁷ In August, 1942 the first elements of the division sailed to Hawaii where they would be one of the first units to receive Pacific focused training.

As filler troops continued to arrive, the division continued

basic training at unit level once in Hawaii. Winter and spring saw the division complete unit training then begin to assemble on Oahu for months of Amphibious warfare and Jungle training. By December 1943 the division was ready and shipped out for Guadalcanal where they would first see action in January, 1944.

One striking point in the 40th ID training period is how closely it matches that of its "sister" division the 41st ID. Even though the 40th started seven months later in the cycle, total training time from activation to combat employment was almost identical. After subtracting the time spend on beach defense the 40th trained two years and five months vice two years and three months for the 41st.

POST 1942 ACTIVATIONS

It is interesting to note that by early 1942 the War Department had learned from and was realizing that their mobilization effort in 1940 and 41 had not gone as well as planned. In an effort to fix the shortfalls, divisions formed after 1942 would be trained and formed under a totally different concept. The 63rd, 65th, 42d, and 70th Infantry Divisions (all formed in the spring of 1943) were good examples of this new process.

Plans officers working for the Army Chief of Staff developed a series of directives which carefully controlled the assigning

of commanders and primary staff to "new" divisions. These post November 1942 directives formed divisions on a cadre principle. The directives also spelled out the time sequence for each element of the division to receive personnel and equipment. The idea was to have personnel and equipment arrive at the same time and have the trainers already in the division waiting for them.

Key commanders and staff were picked by the War Department, from qualified combat (WW I) officers, 37 days before the division was to be activated and sent to special schools to prepare them to assume their new duties in the growing
68
division.

Additional special service officers (Infantry, artillery, signal, and engineers) would also be sent to formal schools at
69
this time. Thirty days prior to activation an additional 172 cadre officers and EM would be selected and sent to the division. Between D-30 and D-20 up to 450 officers and men arrived to fill out command and control elements of the
70
division. On D Day, 13, 400 fillers would enter the division along with fifty percent of the TO&E equipment and the division
71
would be ready to start training.

Division training followed a fairly rigid time frame of forty four weeks at the end of which the unit was ready for echelon above division training.

1

Individual Training	= 17 weeks
Unit up to Regiment	= 13 weeks
Combined Arms	= 14 weeks

This echelon above division training insured that this "new" division would be ready to deploy after one year rather than the two plus years prior to 1942.⁷² The idea here was to take advantage of the experience of all the up to 1,500 officers and EMs which were gradually added to the division prior to and early in it's activation.

One of the problems identified early on with this post 1942 activation method was the habit of robbing these same units of their experience during the training year! Pressure for more divisions would cause HQDA to pull a division wide cadre from units late in their 44 week training cycle. This cadre would then be used to provide a backbone staff for even newer divisions being formed. One of the divisions created under the post 1942 directives, the 63d ID, was striped three times in one year of experienced personnel needed to form cadre for other new divisions.⁷³ Each time the 63d lost these people, training was set back and the division had to train a new command and control team all over again. The 63d ID would perform well once deployed in Europe but each time cadre were pulled, unit, combined Arms, and echelon above division training had to be totally redone.

LESSONS LEARNED IN WORLD WAR II

Training shortfalls for Reserve Components during World War

II were evident in three basic areas; formal education, manpower replacement, and equipment shortages. These areas remained a problem for the length of the war and would be carried forward to the next conflict

Lack of facilities and training areas hurt all units early on. Units like the 41st ID were often forced to literally build their homes as they built their training areas. Even when enough housing was available for a unit, there was rarely enough equipment for the men to train on let alone issue to the unit. Many divisions found themselves schedule masters as they tried to rotate multiple artillery units through firing ranges designed for the far fewer batteries of the pre war army. Even as late as 1943, units would still "que up" for time on the rifle ranges and special training ranges.

The second major shortfall area was that of fillers for under strength units. Enlistment rules and funding did not allow RC units to be manned at war time authorizations so even the best of these were mobilized short many required personnel.

What little high level training and expertise a unit did have was often "robbed" by Peter to pay Paul. Officers and senior NCOs were constantly drained away from units in training to meet cadre and overseas replacement requests. Every time one of these men left the unit esprit de corps and morale suffered and this translated into poorer training.

Even lower ranking men who showed promise were lost to their

units as officer candidate schools and NCO training schools drafted them away. These quality people usually did not return to the units they left. Of the few qualified men left, many were then taken out of line units and placed in their division "basic training" cadre in a major effort to try and process the massive numbers of draftees which each unit had to train simultaneously with ongoing unit training.

The lack of formal army education and job qualification for many men was related to the major reorganization of most divisions in the period from 1940 to 1942. Basic reorganization of the division meant many officers and men were activated before being able to attend their qualification schools.

The pre war National Guard training schedule did not specify a set period to attain combat readiness thereby leaving open⁷⁴ ended the date for training completion. Individual and unit training were also not differentiated in the pre war documents thus there were widely varying standards from one unit to the next.

No common guide for training was provided prior to the war again resulting in many different standards.

ITEMS TO "FIX" AFTER WW II

The following highlights were clear after 1945 as concerned RC units pre and post mobilization training during the war.

1. Units can not be expected to conduct basic training of filler personnel with out slowing down over all unit training goals.
2. Training schedules based on full up manning and skill trained personnel can not be met by units under equipped and undermanned.
3. Lack of training areas and living facilities causes units to "build" rather than train.
4. Lack of schools and training for personnel.

In short, if RC units are to be ready in a reasonable amount of time after activation, they must be manned to near wartime strength. They must also be equipped with the same modern weapons they will fight with upon mobilization. Lastly, they must be resourced and trained to the same standards expected of them upon mobilization. Lack of any of the above will extend time required before a unit is ready for up to two full years.

It is important to look at the Korean War and early 1960s to see if and how these lessons learned were actually applied.

THE FIFTY'S AND SIXTY'S

Two large mobilization actions took place in the interim years after WW II and before Vietnam. The Korean Conflict in the early 1950s and the call up for the Berlin Crisis in 1961-62. It is interesting to look at the similarities and

differences between the two. Both were soon enough after the "big war" to be impacted by lessons learned in the RC mobilizations for WW II. Even more impressive than the massive build up during WW II was the speed at which America had disabled the mightiest war machine on earth. From a high of over eight million men in 1945 the U.S. military had let the army drop to just over five hundred thousand by 1950.

Even more damaging, both active and reserve forces had been starved for resources as the country tried to rebuild Europe and Japan as well as convert the country back to a peace time economy. Many active units were below strength and with out updated equipment as were all reserve units. It is against this backdrop that the North Korean Army invaded the South in June of 1950.

UNITS CALLED FOR KOREAN CONFLICT

Two big differences would characterize the Korean mobilization from that of World War II.

First, Korea would be only a partial mobilization. Neither the country or the army would be required to totally focus on the effort in that this would be our first "limited war".

The second big difference is the limited training time which would be allowed. The oceans, which provided natural borders, gave the United States the luxury of a two year spin up time in

1942. In Korea however, U.S. forces were under attack and the war was being lost so fast that units would have weeks, not months to train. Some individual replacements early on went through twelve days of training after a three day warning to report time, then deployed to combat!⁷⁵

Over one hundred and sixty thousand individual reservists were mobilized and often sent right into theater. Eight Army historians stated that "Officers were trained by combat; EMS trained in division and regimental rear areas."⁷⁶ Some receiving units were lucky however and got well trained fillers. The famous 100th Battalion/442d Infantry of WW II acclaim had all it's officers and NCOs recalled to active duty and sent directly to the front.⁷⁷ These soldiers were well trained and came from the most decorated unit of it's size in U.S. Army history.⁷⁸

Unlike WW II, physical fitness was a major problem for both active and reserve replacements in Korea at the start. Many active units were not only under strength but had been two or three years on "occupation" duty in Japan and elsewhere.⁷⁹ This "duty" most likely was post details and maintenance of equipment with little or no field training attempted. The physical fitness of many of the filler personnel sent so rapidly from state side RC units meant that "it became necessary for replacement organizations to assume physical training responsibilities."⁸⁰ Troops arriving in country were so poorly

conditioned many could not even be used.

In all, eight National Guard divisions and many support units would be mobilized.⁸² Of these, two divisions would be sent to Korea and two to NATO and Germany. Four remained in CONUS as training divisions and a ready replacement base for Korea.⁸³ An additional 14 separate battalions and forty⁸⁴ companies would complete the Army Reserve mobilization.

Short call up time affected the units also. Eighth Army stated that "during the first 14 months of the Korean Campaign, two (top) needs for training existed.

1. The necessity for combat commanders to follow basic offensive and defensive doctrine.
2. The necessity to teach 'basic and fundamental' subjects.⁸⁵

One interesting contrast which can be drawn is the difference in performance of a division called for WW II which was also called for Korea.

ACTIVATION AND TRAINING OF THE 40TH INFANTRY DIVISION

When ordered to active duty on 1 September, 1950, the 40th was a far cry from the division which was activated in March 1941. The 40th like other RC units had been allowed to lose training and people since 1945. It reported to Camp Cooke, California on 6 September with only 9,866 soldiers of an war

time authorization of 19,921. This was less than fifty percent strength. Although the unit was supposed to be filled to war strength plus ten percent no later than October, by late November the division was only up to sixty percent. Prior to November the low strength figures meant that only pre-cycle⁸⁷ training could be done across the division.

Basic training of eleven weeks was to be completed on 20 January 1951 and Advanced Training finished by 21 April. Contrast this eight months (September - April) with the eighteen months allowed to complete the same process in 1941-42!

Training was again hampered by the fact that officers and NCOs were pulled out of the division and sent to attend schools which had been unfinanced and unavailable prior to mobilization.⁸⁸ These men would later be pulled from school prior to completion in order to rejoin the division when it received it's short notice deployment orders.

Individual training continued alongside the unit training just as it had in WW II. Fillers⁸⁹ who needed basic training were once more trained by division personnel who were needed by their units for unit training.⁹⁰ Once again Provisional Training organizations had to be set up in the division to train basic trainees.⁹¹ When the division deployed for Korea, this Provisional Group remained behind in California to finish training four thousand new men.

An administrative action in 1950 which did not exist in 1941

caused much trouble. Current regulations in 1950 would not allow the division to promote officers even if they would have⁹² been promoted had they remained on Reserve or Guard status. This created the situation where non branch qualified or non activated officers back home were promoted while those on active service were not. This action was not corrected until the unit arrived in Korea and then only after the intervention of the⁹³ Eight Army Commander.

MOVEMENT OVERSEAS BY THE 40TH INFANTRY DIVISION

Possibly because the mobilization for Korea was a partial one, training would also be adversely affected by the divisions deployment in a manner unlike WW II. The Station Commander was not dedicated to the movement of the 40th ID so the division was forced to carry out many of the station duties which would⁹⁴ normally be handled by others. Movement, packing, processing for the division further drained qualified personnel from the training base at a time when the unit badly needed them in scheduled training.

Unlike the training cycle in WW II, unit equipment was never repaired nor brought up to standard prior to deployment. Lack of completed Modification Work Orders (MWO) and parts meant that much of the division equipment did not work when it arrived in⁹⁵ Korea. This placed an even greater strain on an already

overloaded Korean logistical base. Even moving the division around the training areas was complicated by the shipment of many unit vehicles overseas. Since there were no "follow on" units, once the 40th ID loaded their vehicles for sea transit, training tempo slowed way down.

Notwithstanding these training distracters, the 40th ID began to ship out for Korea in March 1951 only seven months after mobilization.⁹⁶ Contrast this to the two years and five months used in WW II. Training shortfalls still existed however and the division and both Corps in Korea ran local schools to help fill the shortages in E-5 to E-7 ranks.⁹⁷

The 41st Infantry Division did not undergo a Korea mobilization like the 40th ID so it can not be compared here as it was in WW II.

LESSONS LEARNED IN KOREA

The lessons learned from World War II (WW II) had been forgotten in the five years from 1945 to 1950. The same three major areas of difficulty had been allowed to return and a fourth, partial mobilization, had been added.

Lack of facilities and training areas still hurt. Even though a bigger active army existed than in 1940, much of it was overseas and state side training facilities had been allowed to fall into disrepair. Partial mobilization made this situation

worse as the 40th ID and others found themselves on their own and unsupported by Station Commanders who were themselves over extended.

Fillers for under strength was a big problem just as it had been in WW II but for different reasons. Where as in WW II demand for manpower exceeded the ability to supply it, in Korea the partial mobilization did not generate enough people to meet the need. The end result would be the same, units under strength trying to conduct unit and individual training in the same division at the same time with limited success.

Although the wide spread "robbing" of officers and men as cadre did not happen as often as in WW II, units like the 40th ID still found that many of these troops would be pulled for school and not be in the unit helping to train others. The division had learned however and pulled all these men back from school in time to deploy with the unit to Korea.⁹⁸ The down side here is that the men in question did not finish their formal schooling prior to deployment to combat.

Shortage of equipment in the mobilized units was probably even worse than in 1940 but not because the equipment did not exist. Lack of funding and manpower shortfall kept units from receiving and using the piles of equipment left over from WW II stockpiles.

ITEMS TO "FIX" AFTER KOREA

One could almost quote the closing paragraph from "items" at the end of the WW II section here. The bottom line is the lessons of WW II had not been learned nor applied in time for Korea. There was great "difficulty in using reserve forces for rapid mobilization when their readiness has been permitted to decline."⁹⁹ Reserve units had not been manned to near war time strength. They had not been equipped with all their TO&E authorization. They had not been resourced or trained to the same standards expected of them in combat.¹⁰⁰ On top of all this individuals and units activated for the Korean conflict were "speed trained" and sent into combat in far less time than in WW II. Combat losses and units histories show clearly the results of this training. "The Eight Army was in large part,¹⁰¹ trained by combat and taught by disaster"

As Korea slowly came to a close in the mid fifty's, the cold war began to chill down also. 1961 would see the next major RC mobilization for the country. Would the lessons be learned and applied this time or would the troops pay for the mistakes once more?

UNITS CALLED FOR THE BERLIN CRISIS

July 1961 saw Congress authorize a RC call up of a quarter

of a million men for the period of one year. One of the major differences of this mobilization and those of Korea and WW II was to be the training done in each unit before they were actually called to active duty. A second major difference was that these units would mobilize much closer to authorized strength levels than any prior call up.¹⁰¹

Given adequate prior notice, from July to September the Army and the National Guard Bureau began to single out the units which would be called up.¹⁰² This allowed the units "highlighted" to begin to assess short comings in both manpower and equipment prior to mobilization. Equipment short fall would continue to create some problems as in earlier actions but this lead time would serve to minimize the training impact.¹⁰³

On 6 September the 26th ID, 28th ID, 32d ID, and the 49th Armored Division were placed on an accelerated training schedule.¹⁰⁴ This accelerated schedule was designed to increase the units combat readiness even though the units were not yet on federal service. This head start would also decrease the time required to reach full combat readiness after activation.

During the alert period many units were able to fine tune many report date actions unlike the earlier call ups. Administrative data on individual and unit training status was updated and corrected.¹⁰⁵ School requirements for units and individuals was also planned and documents prepared to institute

training immediately upon activation.

One key element which was copied from the post 1942 WW II division activations was the early call up for unit commanders and other key personnel.¹⁰⁶ This early call allowed the command structure to be in place and functioning when the troops arrived. Training records had been processed and troops could be issued orders as soon as they were assigned to the unit.

On 19 September 1961 the 32d ID and 49th Armored were told they would "activate" no later than 15 October. These two divisions had been completing administrative duties and been running an accelerated training schedule in a reserve status since July; a total of two months. The results of this "head start" program show dramatic differences from the Korea call up. The 32d ID and 49th Armored mobilized on 1 October 1961 at 98.3 percent of war time strength!¹⁰⁷ Compare this to the less than fifty percent of the 40th ID for Korea. In addition, of those mobilized, 97 percent of the personnel were either prior service or had been through six months of active army training.¹⁰⁸ This was at a time (prior to 1958) that new National Guard soldiers did not regularly go to basic training. Fully eighty percent of the officers had seen active service.¹⁰⁹ A far cry indeed from the half manned half trained units of Korea.

Physical fitness was also not the problem it had been before. General James Van Fleet upon inspecting the 32d ID

reported "their quality far above World War II and Korea."¹¹⁰

The shortfall due to delays and exemptions in Korea was in excess of ten percent.¹¹¹ The Berlin mobilization was less than two percent.¹¹² Physical training for the units had not been allowed to fall.

Units also began Intensified Combat Training Programs (ICTP) at their mobilization stations rather than wait till they moved to a training camp.¹¹³ This action again gave the activating units a leg up on their counterparts in previous mobilizations.¹¹⁴ ICTP consisted of three phases.

Phase One:	Crew, squad, platoon training
	Two weeks
Phase Two:	Company and Battery training
	Two weeks
Phase Three:	Battalion, Brigade, and Division
	Field Training Exercises
	Four weeks

Units held to the schedule primarily because of the excellent man power and training start they report to duty with. After the ICTP, units moved right into Operational Readiness Training Program.¹¹⁵ Good training management again proved its worth as both divisions completed their large unit training ahead of schedule. General Powell, Commander, Continental Army, reported the units combat ready in less than four months rather than the six which had been planned for.¹¹⁶ On 15 February, 1962 the 32d ID and the 49th Armored were declared combat ready and assigned to the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) for full duty.¹¹⁷

LESSONS LEARNED IN THE BERLIN CRISIS

The poor showing of post mobilization training for Korea had for the most part been avoided in the Berlin Crisis. There were some clear differences which showed that lessons learned in Korea had not just been noted but applied.

Unit manning had been kept high. divisions activated in 1961 were not faced with filling over fifty percent of their TO&E strength at the same time they were trying to train troops. Report percentages of 97 and 98 percent also meant that when units began individual training all personnel were together. Neither division faced the task of training thousand of draftees simultaneously with the better trained individuals.

Resources in terms of formal school training had also been available in great amount prior to activation. This helped the divisions avoid the pit fall of losing large numbers of qualified NCOs and officers to the school house early in the activation cycle. These key trained personnel were available in the unit to help with training.

Equipment shortages did slow some training but since units had been almost fully manned the big gaps in individual equipment did not exist. This allowed units to begin individual and small unit training immediately while major equipment shortages were made up.

A major factor in the mobilization training was the "Active

Army preserving the unit integrity of all mobilized

units." ¹¹⁸ Unlike Korea and WW II, units were not "hit" two and three times for qualified personnel to go off to other cadre divisions. Units were alerted, mobilized, and trained as integrated units. Esprit de Corps and morale thus served as training multipliers, not distracters.

ITEMS TO "FIX" AFTER BERLIN

This for the most part was a case of doing it right. After two wars of forgetting what is required to ensure rapid availability of RC units, the country had applied the lessons learned from Korea and WW II. In a period of less than five months (October to early February) more than 45,000 individuals from 447 units had mobilized, trained, and deployed as combat ready. The question now was would we continue to apply these lessons learned or would the country forget or ignore these lessons while preparing for another war?

VIETNAM

Reserve Component call up for the Vietnam Conflict would clearly demonstrate that lessons learned could easily be lost in a relatively short time. A number of events which seem to be unconnected took place in the three years prior to the 1968 call

up which in hindsight caused major difficulties.

First, in the summer of 1965 when first use of a RC call up was voiced, the President decided to use Selective Service draftees to reconstitute the Strategic Reserve rather than use RC units as had been done in 1961-2.¹¹⁹ Although this was probably a wise political move coming so close after the large call up for Berlin, it set the stage for problems in 1968. The mostly positive actions of the 1961 mobilization would lull the Department of Defense into only keeping minimal attention on RC units from 1962 through 1967.

Secondly, the Secretary of Defense also eliminated all six Army Reserve Divisions from the force structure in 1965.¹²⁰ This loss of unit slots for experienced officers and NCOs meant that three years later many personnel shortages would exist.

Compounding this problem, in 1966 the Secretary of the Army responded to deficiencies in the RC readiness reporting system by suspending the entire reporting system while a better system could be devised.¹²¹ While the initiative was a good idea, a problem developed because little effort was placed on finding a timely fix. This meant that when Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) needed timely and detailed readiness data to plan the 1968 mobilization and training, such data was not available.

Finally, the last major item which would impact on the '68 call up was the RC reorganization ordered 1 December 1967. From

December 1967 through May 1968 the Reserve units nation wide were undergoing the most extensive TO&E changes since WW¹²² II. This reorganization would mean that almost any unit called in the spring of 1968 would be right in the middle of MOS and equipment change over. Consequently when the Vietnam era came, the reserve component system was in the midst of turmoil and change.

UNITS CALLED FOR THE VIETNAM CONFLICT

The call up of units in the Vietnam era was prompted by two separate crisis. The intelligence ship, U.S.S. Pueblo was sized in January 1968 off the coast of Korea. Noting the stress already placed on the Strategic Army Forces (STRAF) by three years of draftee input, planning began to look at a partial mobilization.¹²³ This partial call up was to cover the possible Korea requirements if war broke out over the Pueblo seizure plus help expand the manpower base for Vietnam. The 1968 Tet Offensive had also just begun and the need for dramatically increased manpower was in the offing.

From February to April, HQDA looked at plans for a partial mobilization. Both WW II and Korea were at least to some degree popular conflicts but the Vietnam War was rapidly becoming an unpopular cause. This presented planners with a unique problem. Because of the sensitivity of an RC call up, HQDA was

forced to do most of their planning in a vacuum.

With the Department of Defense (DOD) keeping a very tight hold on all actions, HQDA developed multiple troop lists to support three basic requirements.¹²⁴ In order of priority in February 1968 these were...

Mobilize to sustain Vietnam.
Reinforce Korea.
Reconstituting the STRAF.

Unit selection factored in requests from the Commander, Military Command Vietnam (MACV), Commander in Chief, Korea, and recommendations from the DA staff on how to fill out the STRAF.¹²⁵ The Pueblo issues dropped to the back burner as Tet losses mounted and the Korea requirement was dropped by April.¹²⁶

Two categories of units were identified by HQDA. Those for deployment to South East Asia (SEA) and those planned for STRAF units.¹²⁷ Since the primary need was manpower in SEA, there was a "hidden" tasker of providing filler personnel built into the STRAF bound units. This "hidden" tasker would come home to roost with a vengeance in 1969.

Reserve mobilization was announced on 11 April 1968 and all that could go wrong had or did. Financial support had been the main driver on the numbers called, not operational requirements.¹²⁸ The guns and butter policy of the Johnson Administration refused to increase taxes or shift "Great

Society" funds to help pay for the mobilization. This money problem would be multiplied as major commands which would host the activated units received little or no money to accomplish the task and had to take it "out of hide".¹²⁹

A total of 76 units containing over twenty thousand men were called. These units were two Separate Infantry Brigades, one Armored Cavalry Regiment, and assorted support units.¹¹³⁰

POLITICAL FACTORS

As this was the first war in years which had a large percent of negative public feeling, many political factors impacted on both the call up and therefore the training picture. Because of political sensitivities, units were specially selected so that there would not be an excessive drain on either the National Guard or the Army Reserve. Thus, 60% of the units were Army Guard and 40% were Army Reserve.¹³¹

Geographic considerations also came into play. The final troop list contained units from over thirty states. Although this spread the "hit" across the land, it almost insured that some less ready units would be called since burden sharing and geographical spread were more important than readiness.¹³²

The close hold nature of the political climate meant that partial mobilization plans developed and used so successfully in the Berlin Crisis could not be used and Army planners were

forced to make it up as they went along.¹³³ This also insured that coordination with Continental Command and other staffs at USAR and NGB was poor to nonexistent.

DOD decided not to use any officer IRR as part of the call up.¹³⁴ This political choice would cause the drain on active army sources to increase and ensure that officer shortages in any mobilizing unit would take longer to fill. The lack of enough officers would have a direct impact on training time.

The last political decision by DOD was perhaps be the most damaging. DOD prohibited the Army from following the established alert notification procedures in effect since the Berlin call up. This action meant that no training plans or advance actions could be taken before actual unit notification. All of the head start activities which had made the Berlin call up work were therefor denied by administrative action. Major political damage also resulted when DOD publicly announced the mobilization before allowing the Army to tell the units.¹³⁵ This caused many individuals and unit commanders to find out from radio and TV that their units had been called.

Another area of impact on the mobilization was the inclusion on Strategic Reserve Forces (SRF) in the call up. Strategic Reserve Forces was a designation used by HQDA to highlight certain RC units for special manning, funding and equipment during the early 1960's. Units so designated received extra training resources and drill time to enable them to be "more

ready" than most RC units.

Two large units made up the bulk of the 1968 call up and serve as interesting role models for what did and did not go right. Although called SRF forces, both units would end up serving as replacement pools for South East Asia to such a degree that they were often totally incapable of acting in a Strategic Reserve Force role.

ACTIVATION OF THE 29TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (SEP)

Alert and activation of the 29th Separate Infantry Brigade, Hawaii Army National Guard (hereafter called the 29th SIB) followed the poorly organized scenario of other units called in early 1968. Many members of the unit heard about their activation via rumor and public media days before official¹³⁶ notification was received by the unit. Official notification went out to the Brigade and it's major attached unit, the 100th Battalion/442d Infantry, USAR, on 15 April. Two CONUS based units which would be attached to the Brigade were also notified. These were the 40th Aviation company and the¹³⁷ 227th Military Intelligence Detachment. Both mainland units would be deployed to Hawaii for activation and training.

The 29th SIB was told to be "trained to a state of¹³⁸ operational readiness (by) early autumn 1968. The poor coordination by DA prior to mobilization had its immediate

impact. CONUS based units which deployed to Hawaii for training were not authorized PCS moves for their families as Hawaii was an "overseas" station.¹³⁹ This resulted in a major section of the Brigade feeling that they had been unfairly treated since the rest of the unit had their families on station.

By developing the troop list for political rather than operational reasons, DA had also given a Brigade which had been a Selected Reserve Force (SRF) for almost three years a line battalion which was not SRF.¹⁴⁰ Units in the SRF had been authorized increased training resources and time for that three years. The 100th/442d Infantry (USAR) had not had this advantage and reported with significantly lower percentages of personnel and equipment which had to be made up.¹⁴¹

Administrative and supply records were another area of concern on mobilization day. Although the USAR units kept records similar to the Active force, there had been little effort by DA or NGB to insure common paper work for the National Guard. As a result, the Guard records of the Brigade required major effort to reconcile upon mobilization.¹⁴² This brought back memories of the early WW II problems and would eventually take almost the first two months after mobilization to finally fix.¹⁴³

Command and control, although not directly related to the poor planning by higher headquarters, was adversely affected by ongoing army policy. Because the serving Brigade commander was

close to his ETS, the Brigade changed command on 4 May

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1968! In the following two years of federal service various army personnel directives would lead to the Brigade changing command six times.

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The 29th SIB mobilized on 13 May 1968 at 83% strength. Circumstances had precluded it from any advance training up time or planning time. The scheduling and school planning granted in earlier call ups would, like WW II, have to be done "on the fly". This percentage meant that the unit was over one thousand personnel short of authorization on mobilization day. By 27 May the last of the CONUS based units had arrived and the Brigade was ready to begin training.

TRAINING OF THE 29TH BRIGADE (SEP)

One almost has a feeling of time warp when reading about the post activation training for the 29th SIB. Many of the "solved after WW II" problems have come back to haunt the army once more. On 27 May 1968 the Brigade started training and was finally given its training guidance from U.S. Army, Hawaii (USARHAW).

The first two weeks are spent clearing up administrative and logistical details which in two earlier mobilizations were

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handled prior to call up. The first request for over 1,000 filler personnel is forwarded, again after rather than before

activation.

Facilities problems also came back to plague the unit. Since the 25th ID had all been sent to Vietnam earlier there are no host units on Schofield Barracks to handle routine duties and the Brigade was required not only to maintain the ranges and training sites but in many cases bring them up to army standards¹⁴⁷ before any training can take place. Although they will be complemented by higher headquarters for the great job done, it still means engineer units are not combat training as they should. The situation is further aggravated when the Brigade is¹⁴⁸ told they must also pull Post Details. Still another lesson "lost". During WW II activating units had been specifically prohibited from Post Details because of the training time lost to the unit.

The thirteen week training program established by the Army school house at that time called for two months of Basic Unit Training first.¹⁴⁹ Through May and June the 29th was to train on individual weapons qualification then squad training. M1 rifles were exchanged for M14 rifles and qualification¹⁵⁰ started. This turned out to be wasted training when the army finally gave the unit M16 rifles later that year causing the entire Brigade to undergo weapons qualification all over again.

New signal equipment was also issued and the 29th began to train on the new series radios. Many officers and NOCs are

pulled out of the unit and sent to formal schooling in a repeat of the WW II problem. While at school, the unit was without their services.

Advanced Unit Training (AUT) began in late summer and by the end of September (four months after mobilization) the unit is at C-1 status and ready to start Operational Readiness Training¹⁵¹ (ORT). The Brigade hit 100% personnel fill in late October and by 1 January 1969 all units of the 29th were well into the ORT cycle. The Brigade was declared combat ready at the end of January 1969, eight months after mobilization having over come major obstacles in the process.

THE LEVEE PROBLEM

Although not directly related to post mobilization training the levee problem in the Vietnam call up needs to mentioned. Both major infantry Brigades called became subject to massive levies to provide man power for Vietnam as soon as they were declared combat ready. This created not only a problem in morale and public relations for soldiers who were expecting to be deployed as units but also quickly destroyed any pretense of combat readiness for the unit.

In the first three months of 1969 (immediately after reaching combat ready status) the 29th SIB was required to send¹⁵² 1,500 people from the Brigade to Vietnam. This was over

one third of the unit authorized strength! Morale, combat readiness, and unit cohesion was destroyed. Using units as "cannon fodder" for an unpopular war also caused the DOD major public relations and political problems.

The final bill came due in the fall of 1969 as the 29th SIB began to plan for it's December demobilization. With many of it's best officers and NCOs ~~on~~ longer in the unit due to the levies, an very under strength brigade tried to demobilize with the same poor guidance from higher as during activation. The after action report states "one HQS held more than 50 messages from different agencies concerning demobilization."¹⁵³

ACTIVATION AND TRAINING OF THE 69TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

The experiences of the 29th SIB should be compared with the other major brigade activated, the 69th Infantry Brigade (Separate), hereafter called the 69th SIB. Although not required to move out of CONUS for any of it's training, the 69th SIB had many of the same problems as the Hawaii based unit. Upon activation the 69th SIB moved from it's armories in Kansas to Ft. Carson, Colorado in order to find training room.

Individual training status in the 69th SIB mirrored that of the 29th SIB. Restrictions on the use of officer IRR and the recent TO&E changes caused the 69th SIB to report with many non-qualified officers and NCOs.¹⁵⁴ DA directives had stated

that units would not be activated if they had just undergone a major TO&E change but 25% of those called were in the middle of doing just that!

Active duty fillers were late in coming from a system already stressed to provide replacements to Vietnam and when officers left the 69th SIB for formal schools, the same shortage of trainers hit the unit.

Shortage of equipment was also a problem for the 69th SIB. Two thirds of the shortfall was to be made up by June and the unit was to be fully equipped by July.¹⁵⁵ The problem here is obvious, how can a unit adequately train while it waits for it's equipment?

Host unit problems were somewhat eased for the 69th as part of the 5th Mechanized Division was still at Ft. Carson when the SIB arrived. The 5th Mech Division was only able to provide partial assistance since it was in the process of deploying to Vietnam itself! Money for the host was also a problem since just like USARPAC, the Ft. Carson command had been given no funds to provide training assistance to the 69th SIB.¹⁵⁶

Administrative detail also proved to be a problem. HQDA stated after the fact that "units need a period of 'grace' after arrival at mob station to square away log, billeting, admin, etc. before being required to report training status."¹⁵⁷

Again the lack of lead time between notification and actual activation caused down stream training problems as shortages could not be

planned for until the unit reached the training base.

Army Training programs of the day required that the "unit has authorized grade and skill levels" and be fully

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manned. Just like WW II, few if any units met this status and all were required to train individual replacements at the same time they were attempting to conduct higher level unit training. Units were forced through a familiar drill of

1. Being issued much new equipment.
2. Losing many non-qualified personnel to schools or non-deployment.
3. Absorbing numerous "fillers" of widely varied qualifications.
4. Being leveed repeatedly for trained man power for SEA.
5. After 1-4 above, try to plan and conduct individual and unit training.

It was a minor miracle that any of the units managed to reach operational readiness goals in the short time that they did.

LESSONS LEARNED IN VIETNAM

The need to establish official notification procedures had been "unlearned" after the Berlin Crisis. Even though a set system existed, DOD's public announcement and orders precluding HQDA from exercising the correct channel resulted in poor
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coordination and confusing notification for many. The present day instant news system demonstrated by CNN television

may make official notification even harder to pull off in the future.

The size of the mobilization and the issue of new equipment both once more caused a delay in combat readiness by extending the unit's training time. Lack of a "host" unit adversely impacted on both infantry brigade's training cycles.¹⁶⁰

Planning and stationing arrangements need to be expansive enough to involve all the players. Too often receiving and losing commands had little to say in the mobilization and or training plans until called upon to execute same. This resulted in units being sent to stations unable to host or provide facilities for them.¹¹⁶¹

ITEMS TO "FIX" AFTER VIETNAM

Once more there was great "difficulty in using reserve forces for rapid mobilization when their readiness has been permitted to decline due to lack of resourcing."¹⁶² Units were once more not resourced or funded at any level close to their combat requirements. Officer branch schooling, MOS qualification training, and formal schools for NCOs had all been allowed to decline.¹⁶³

What little planning had been done in advance was often "avoided" by DOD directives or political avoidance measures. The Department of the Army summed it up when it stated...

"The requirement for additional training time should not...be attributed to deficiencies in Reserve Component training. It was largely a result of the MOS qualification problems caused by reorganization, the need to retrain on new equipment, and infusion of new personnel. These were foreseeable and... should have been considered in pre mobilization estimates."

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These "fixes" have been placed in the system to differing degrees since the Vietnam War. In the following conclusions and recommendations let us look at how the history of these conflicts and their lessons learned can apply to future RC mobilization and training needs, especially for Pacific bound units.

CONCLUSIONS

As the conflicts of the past fifty years have been reviewed: three problem areas continue to reoccur when RC mobilization takes place. The three areas of difficulty in order are: Lack of Formal Military Education, Equipment shortfalls, and Manpower. The lack of institutional memory and/or will has caused repeated problems in these areas for RC mobilization and training over half a century. A discussion of these problem

areas will set the stage for future recommendations.

FORMAL EDUCATION

The lack of job qualification for mobilized RC soldiers has been a major training distracter for each of the conflicts studied. This is a result of two primary forces; poor funding in peace time for schools (both enlisted and officer courses) as well as force structure changes.

In both WW II and Vietnam mobilizations, major force structure changes took place immediately prior to or during the mobilization and training time. This caused an immediate drop in qualified personnel in each unit. Many units found themselves trying to learn new skills at the same time they were receiving and training on new equipment.

Low quotas for Army schools and lack of funding insured that even willing RC members had little chance to attend formal training prior to mobilization. This meant that "on the job" training took the place of standardized Army instruction with resulting loss of quality.

A loss of Officers and NCOs after mobilization resulted from the policies above. Immediately after mobilization, when a unit needed all the qualified trainers available, these individuals were pulled from their units and sent to their respective formal schools so they could receive "proper" training. Due to such practices units were in even worse shape, in terms of manning, than they were on mobilization day. The demand for qualified leaders in WW II, Korea, and Vietnam also meant that many good soldiers would be pulled from the unit and sent to Officer Candidate

School, NCO Academes, and special training schools. These policies further damaged the training and leader base of the mobilized units.

EQUIPMENT SHORTFALLS

A second major area of concern for each mobilization was the lack of modernized TO&E equipment. "Interoperability...requires that reserve forces receive equipment compatible with that of the active units that they support."¹⁶⁵ Even as late as the Vietnam war, activated units were forced to undergo individual weapons qualification repeatedly as their rifles were upgraded two times during the mobilization period. In the just completed Desert Shield operation, water purification units arrived in the desert to find their TO&E equipment had been upgraded and was¹⁶⁶ different from what they had been trained on. Only the high caliber of the troops enabled them to "crash course" the manuals and begin to use the equipment in a number of hours.

Closely associated with equipment deficiencies, facilities short falls and their lack of repair has been another reoccurring problem for each RC mobilization. In all three conflicts there was a shortage of training facilities for the newly mobilized units which required them in many cases to build their own. This was the result of years of down sizing the active force and the inability of the system to provide funds to support facilities which were not daily in use. Even the facilities which did exist were often in poor repair because station commanders had no funding for their upkeep and active units were not present to use them daily.

Loss of facilities is an especially dangerous problem which will bear close watching in the future. It is difficult in the best of times to defend funds for little or under used facilities yet these assets are often the most critical in the event of a mobilization.

MANPOWER

Man power or lack of it is the third problem area highlighted in this study. During peace time, regulations and funding have often driven RC units to less than wartime manning levels. If this shortfall is minor, two or three percent, and is not in critical areas, there is little problem. An example of this is when Berlin activated units reported at 97-98% strength and trained up well within their required time window. Double digit short fall is another matter! WW II, Korea, and Vietnam showed units which had been held by budget and authorization to peace time strength figures of 50-60% prior to being called up. In each case this major manpower shortage caused training and equipping delays well past the ready time required.

Since units were not up to strength, untrained or under trained fillers were supplied in each of the mobilizations discussed. This meant that each unit would receive large numbers of soldiers who required basic training at the exact time the unit was trying to shift from individual to unit training. The only solution in each case was to pull already short supply Officers and NCOs out of companies and battalions to run mini-courses in basic training.

A third manpower drain was the Armies thirst for good leaders in each war. Officers and NCOs identified as leader quality were pulled to cadre other units or for higher level schooling. Few if any of these top quality people returned to the units they left and which so desperately needed them. As one company commander in the 45th Infantry Division said about this unwelcome loss of good personnel in 1940, "It got to where you hid your good soldiers because every time someone did a good job, you lost¹⁶⁷ them!"

After reviewing the historical record, showing very clearly a commonality of experience in three wars, two clear historical facts stand out. First, the residual active force becomes larger after each conflict and it has traditionally become larger initially through the use of Reserve Components. Second, after each conflict the reserve forces have become more regulated and "matched" to the AC. This is a trend which will probably continue.

Clausewitz said that the first and foremost act of statesmen was to¹⁶⁸ "establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking." The Secretary of Defense clearly spells out a regional focus for all forces in¹⁶⁹ the future. These guide posts set the stage for recommendations on both RC and AC forces in the future. Let us look at some guidance and recommendations for mobilization training as we move into the 21st century.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Why do we need to worry about the training status of the RC as we move into the 21st century? By many accounts, the "bear is dead; peace is breaking out all over." These kinds of statements fail to look at the world which exists around us. Iraq and Desert Storm notwithstanding, there are still many problems for the U.S. which have the potential to involve military force. As the Active Force is down sized no matter what shape the RC takes as a result, the need for RC mobilizations will still exist.

The new world order presents many multi-polar scenarios which call for "marshalling of resources...beyond industrial surge but below those¹⁷⁰ required for major war." Any such marshalling will involve RC forces. Nation wide the RC exists in the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard. In the Army alone they make up over 70% of the¹⁷¹ transportation, maintenance, and supply units. Even if these numbers change, there will remain a need to insure ready trained RC units. Today's Active Army requires RC support if four or more divisions deploy¹⁷² or if two or more divisions deploy indefinitely.

As regional focus based on regional threats plays a larger and larger role in the Army of the future, mobilization training will take on a more specific direction for each regional RC unit. Most scenarios still show the Pacific as being troop poor so efforts to identify training requirements to fit RC units in the Pacific remain important and valid. The following recommendations address the three historical conclusions

stated earlier as they apply to Pacific based RC components.

FORMAL EDUCATION

In a period of shrinking dollars the temptation to short change the RC school budget must be vigorously fought. " 'First to Fight' policy...may need to be re-looked after the Multi-Polar world makes 'First to Fight' harder to identify"¹⁷³ A prime example here is the deployment of the 24th Mechanized Division to Desert Shield before many higher priority European units. Although the 24th did not take their RC brigade, the RC equipment was used for AC training while the active component equipment was shipped by boat. This ability to continue training while awaiting deployment significantly improved the 24th Division's opportunity to maintain readiness.

Dollars spent to insure reserve units are MOS qualified also pay war time dividends, witness the before mentioned water purification unit. Mail, medical, and transportation units also transitioned immediately from civilian to military work mainly because they were formally trained and qualified prior to mobilization. Short sighted funding for schools pushes an other wise well equipped and manned unit farther away from timely readiness.

Active and Reserve units require some fillers to make 100% war time strength upon deployment. Again, having school trained officers and NCOs prior to mobilization means these people stay with the unit and lead; not depart to attend school!

EQUIPMENT SHORTFALLS

Modernized TO&E equipment will initially be easy to obtain for RC units as the AC down sizes. In the out years, 1995-2000, this will not be the case. Regional threats, type of unit, and historical train up time all need to be remembered when fielding list priorities are established. Major efforts need to continue to modernize all army units in the shortest time frame possible if we do not want to artificially lengthen mobilization times.

Facilities or lack thereof have the potential to be most damaging over the long term. As the AC down sizes, their ability to justify and fund upgrading and upkeep of existing facilities becomes limited. The partnership of RC and AC needs may be one way to insure funding resources in this critical area are not cut below minimums.

MANPOWER FILLERS

Lack of a current draft means the likelihood of large numbers of fillers for mobilized units is unlikely. Although this minimizes the possibility for the same disruption seen in WW II, Korea, and Vietnam, it also means manning levels today are even more critical. Units which are required in any short time contingency (less than 180 days) must be manned at or very near war time requirements since any filler "off the street" would require a minimum of five months to process.

The drain of good leaders to fill rapidly increasing Army wide needs

is difficult to address directly. A hidden advantage of full manning and fully trained leaders is that if you then must pull leaders after mobilization at least you are taking from a 100% pool not one which is already half empty! Cadre units although traditionally fraught with poor planning and lack of realistic resources may be a further solution if problems in their management can be worked out.

CLOSING

The bottom line is you get what you pay for! If the requirement is for well equipped, trained, and deployable troops, resources must be spent in peace time. There is no short cut or magic fix. Realistic mobilization windows can be met by almost any unit if it is manned to wartime strength, equipped with modern arms, and school trained to MOS and leader standards. Units at 50% strength, with old equipment, and non-school trained soldiers save little if any time when force structure is needed.

RC units throughout the history of this country have shown that when resourced and trained to standard, they preform magnificently as they proudly and professionally rally to their nations call.

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5. Ibid., p. 34
6. Ibid.
7. Jacobs, p. 4.
8. Kicklighter, p. 2.
9. Michael A. Andrews, COL, "Inactivation-A Commander's Perspective," Military Review, November 1990, p. 2.
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11. Harry G. Summers, Low-Intensity Conflict, p. 61.
12. Raymond E. Gandy, Jr., COL, Personal note, as USAR Infantry Battalion Commander, activated Bravo Company, 100th Battalion/442d Infantry for 46 days in 1987 on Presidential Order for disaster relief in American Samoa. Time from impact of Hurricane to total company activation and employment was less than 48 hours.
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30. Newland, Para, p. 42.

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36. Ibid., p. 44.

37. DOD TFPS, p.14.
38. Cramer, p. 3.
39. Ibid.
40. Thomas R. Rozman, LTC, "The Expansible Army," Military Review, November 1990, p. 32.
41. Newland, Para, p. 50.
42. Newland, PAR, p. 71.
43. Newland, Para, p. 45.
44. Rozman, p. 32.
45. Ibid., p. 34.
46. Ibid.
47. DOD TFPS, p. 14.
48. William F. McCartney, The Jungleers, A History of the 41st Infantry Division, p. 1.
49. Ibid.
50. 40th Infantry Division; The years of World War II, United States Army, p. 90.
51. McCartney, p. 3.
52. Samuel King, COL (Ret), Personnal note. COL King joined the 41st ID as a Lt. just after their activation and remained with the division throughout it's long proud history during the second world war. COL King was interviewed by the author in COL King's home in Washington D.C., January, 1991.
53. McCartney, p. 1.
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114. Guard Bureau, Annual Report, p. 11.
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid., p. 12.
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120. MRF, p. i.
121. Ibid.
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123. Ibid., p. 1-1.
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126. Ibid., p. 1-6.
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128. Ibid., p. 2-2.

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137. Interviews by the author with family members and unit members. Author's brother-in-law was a member of the 29th SIB when it was mobilized. The lack of a sense of "taking care of soldiers" began with the poorly handled mobilization orders. This distrust of the "official system" to care for the problems of the soldier would reap much political bad will for the DOD which could easily have been avoided.

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167. From comments made by LTG Ward, Chief of Army Reserve, in a presentation to the U.S. Army War College, Class of 1991, January, 1991.

168. Interview by the author with his father, COL R.E. Gandy, USAF (RET), at his home in Oklahoma March, 1991. COL Gandy was a Machine Gun Company commander with the 45th Infantry Division (National Guard) in 1940 when the division was mobilized. Of note here, COL Gandy a year later would be one of those officers referred to in the text when his was pulled from the unit and sent to aviation flight school training, never to return to the division.

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